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erpetual reevaluations of the mind-body relationship 
argued from religion leave empirically minded materi-
alists with the dissatisfying truth that “disproof” of soul 
existence is as elusive as dualists’ postulations of 
“proof,” because, of course, religious systems are founded upon 
faith.  This is the case, according to philosopher of religion Steph-
an Davis, because “[n]o thesis having to do with the presence or 
absence of a soul—or of a certain soul—is ever testable; there are 
no criteria for determining [a soul].”1  This dichotomy results in a 
semantical problem (what does “soul” mean?), leading to an 
epistemological problem (how can we know whether the soul 
truly exists and does it actually complete man in the realization 
of his form?), ultimating in an ontological problem (does the soul 
represent life-force and purpose, thereby instilling man with the 
requisite intelligence, spirituality, and reason to affirm said pur-
pose?)—all of which are confounded by metaphysics.  And if 
man employs reason in the pursuit of happiness, is the concep-
tion of the soul the determining factor in the attainment of said 
happiness?  If so, does the soul not simply represent an autono-
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mously undeniable, though immaterial, life-force?  In light of 
cognitive and neurological scientific advancements, along with 
linguistic and biological evolution, much of man’s evolved brain 
functions account for many of the properties traditionally at-
tributed to the immaterial soul.  That said, this neither seems to 
deny man a spiritual capacity, nor deny him of his human-
defining faculty of reason—deliberate actions taken to achieve 
happiness as judged through cost-benefit analyses.  But Saint 
Thomas of Aquino deemed it necessary to define and mate the 
notions of spirituality and reason in man as leading to happiness.  
The problem with this line of thinking is that one of these capaci-
ties will always rely on the other for determining truth.  Histori-
an of philosophy Richard E. Rubenstein says of this that 
“Thomas had made a hash of things by conflating the[se] two 
realms” thus resulting in confluence: “His system had mystified 
nature.”2   
The lasting result of Thomas Aquinas’ relationship between 
reason and spirituality yields contemporary dualists across reli-
gious and cultural divides to hold to an almost innate and requi-
site notion of a soul to explain life, or imply something beyond 
us.  But why is the presumed need to believe in an immaterial, 
otherworldly soul so firmly held—held irrationally by rational 
animals for a spiritual connectedness?  I posit that the soul is not 
necessary for spiritual capacity in man, instead arguing that the 
soul merely serves as a conception presumed to be necessary for 
spirituality, and that the steadfastness to retain notions of the 
soul as representing answers to life questions is archaic and 
thought constraining.  This disparity begs definitional assess-
ment and philosophical inquiry into the conception of the soul. 
For the purpose of this paper, interpretive and critical efforts 
will focus on the Thomistic soul and its influential longevity, due 
to the pains taken by Thomas Aquinas to define an immaterial 
conception as instilling the requisite life-giving properties of 
man, while simultaneously affirming Biblical interpretations of 
the soul.  And although the Thomistic soul is Biblically-based, 
“soul” has different meanings in the Old Testament as compared 
with the New Testament’s treatment thereof.  For example, the 
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Hebrew word nephesh is used throughout the Old Testament to 
denote an individual life with a material body; nevertheless, 
nephesh is translated in contemporary terminology as “soul.”3  In 
contrast, the soul of the New Testament shows itself to be heavi-
ly influenced by the Hellenization of the Holy Land, representing 
something more akin to the Greek conception of an immaterial 
spirituality, which continues in eternal conscious existence after 
the human body passes away.  Thomas sought to meld the vari-
ous Biblical conceptions of the soul by employing an Aristotelian 
approach, thereby resulting in a systematic theological science 
concerning the soul, Christian or otherwise.  The outcome of 
Thomas’ efforts yields a hylomorphic interpretation of the soul-
body relationship: the body and soul are necessarily related to 
one another as form and matter, resulting in one entity.  The lin-
gering effects of the Thomistic soul are neither fully materialist in 
scope (physicalist), nor dualist; rather, the Thomistic soul shares 
defining qualities of both theoretical platforms and serves as a 
median philosophy between the two, offered as definitive.  An 
evaluation of Thomas’ work on the subject will help flesh out this 
dichotomy. 
The Thomistic soul is defined as being the subsistent and in-
corruptible – constant and unchanging—form of man.  Through 
the realization of the soul-body relationship, the soul represents 
man’s conscious and mental faculties, as well as the life-giving 
property necessary in making the body animate—alive.  Thomas 
makes this clear when he says, “the human soul is a spiritual 
substance; but inasmuch as it is touched upon by matter and 
shares its own actual being with matter, it is the form of the 
body.”4  In line with this definition is the extrapolation that a 
body does not actually become a living being until the soul in-
forms the body of its form, thereby ultimating in a living human 
being.  Thomistic scholars Robert Pasnau and Christopher 
Shields say of this that “a living body is that which is potentially 
alive.  A form, or soul, is that whose presence makes it actually 
alive.”5  Accordingly, Thomas premises that “the soul is defined 
as the first principle of life in those things in our world which 
live; for which we call living things animate.”6  The soul, there-
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fore, is not inanimate but is an active informant to the body of 
the body’s form.  Regarding this, Thomistic authority Eleonore 
Stump holds that “by ‘form’ Thomas means an essentially config-
urational state.”7  From this it follows that a human being is not 
identical with his requisite soul but requires it to realize his hu-
man form, and together they function as one.  This is a fair inter-
pretation of the soul-body relationship within Thomism because 
“a human being is not a soul only but rather a composite of soul 
and body.”8  
The relational necessity of the soul to a non-living body, 
which results in a living human being, is not unique to man.  An-
imals too are defined by their souls, as outlined by Thomas’ intel-
lectual forebearer, Aristotle.  In working within an Aristotelian 
framework, Thomas asserts that all life is realized in accordance 
with a hierarchical order of souls: vegetative  appetitive  ra-
tional.  These functions provide life-defining characteristics to 
matter, thus informing matter of its liveliness through its form—
actuating life in line with matter’s natural inclinations.  Thomas 
articulates this in saying that “[e]ach being comes to be a mem-
ber of its species through its essential form.  Now a human being 
is human insofar as he is rational.  Therefore, a rational soul is 
the essential form of a human being.”9  Both Aristotle and Thom-
as declare rational animals to be at the top of the hierarchical or-
der of souls, and rightfully so, because they both assert that hu-
mans possess all the abilities of the lower faculties in addition to 
the faculty of reason.  In accordance with the faculties of souls 
among living things, Thomas separates the rational animal (man) 
from non-human animals by stating that through reason man is 
afforded intelligence, cognition, linguistic faculties, spirituality, 
and morality.  Thomas concludes that “man understands 
through the soul,” in that he relies on “the principle of intellectu-
al operation.”10  It is through the soul’s intellection and reasoning 
that man deliberates and acts over his dominion (Gen. 1.26-28).   
Another approach to the culmination of these phenomena is 
through actually assessing man’s cognitive faculties, as opposed 
to inferring definitive proclamations through spirituality.  Ac-
cording to philosopher Paul Churchland, this cannot be stressed 
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enough: “To decide scientific questions by appeal to religious 
orthodoxy would therefore be to put social forces in place of em-
pirical evidence.”11  In the effort of empiricism, man’s mental fac-
ulties are explored via psychology and the cognitive and neuro-
logical sciences.  These scientific approaches attempt to under-
stand the mind by mapping and exploring brain functions in ac-
cordance with actions, feelings, memories, and intelligibility.  
According to psychologist Steven Pinker, ideas that hold that a 
soul is the defining factor of the mind and the mind’s relation-
ship to the body are brazenly problematic due to “the over-
whelming evidence that the mind is the activity of the brain.”12 
This line of thinking serves as the general foundation for many 
materialists, who thus look to the cognitive and neurological sci-
ences as the starting point for answers pertaining to human func-
tions and purpose.  To a certain extent, though, Thomas recog-
nizes this type of materialist interpretation of man’s physiology, 
when he infers, concerning the mind-body question, that 
“medical men assign a certain particular organ, namely, the mid-
dle part of the head: for it compares individual intentions, just as 
the intellectual reason compares universal intentions.”13  But be-
cause he defines these attributes as appetitive powers of the soul, 
he constrains the mind-body question to terms of unwavering 
hylomorphic dualism.  In rebutting this type of thinking, Church-
land counters by arguing that “[c]ompared to the rich resources 
and explanatory success of current materialism, dualism is less a 
theory of mind than it is an empty space waiting for a genuine 
theory of mind to be put in it,” and that “what the neuroscientist 
can tell us about the brain, and what he can do with that 
knowledge, [discounts] what the dualist can tell us about spiritu-
al substance, and what he can do with those assumptions.”14 
For Thomas, though, the starting point for questions about 
life and answers pertaining to human cognition is explained in 
the realization of the soul informing the body as instilled and de-
fined by God; for Thomas states that “while the souls of brutes 
are produced by some power of the body, the human soul is pro-
duced by God.”15  Thomas likely arrived at this conclusion from 
the second creation account in Genesis, which reads, “the Lord 
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God formed man from the dust of the ground, and breathed into 
his nostrils the breath of life; and … man became a living be-
ing” (Gen. 2.7 NRSV).16  But is human life the culmination of soul 
(intellect) and body, thereby equating to the philosophically de-
fensible notion that life is undeniably realized through the soul 
informing the body of the body’s form?  Pinker answers authori-
tatively by saying absolutely not: “A spirit [soul] is stipulated to 
be exempt from one or more of the laws of biology (growing, ag-
ing, dying)” and thus “[represents] hypotheses intended to ex-
plain certain data that stymie our everyday theories.”17 From this 
it is apparent that the soul seems unable to comport with observ-
able science, not merely for its immateriality but because it pre-
sumes to account for man’s mental cognition and rationale.  Why 
can life not be defined as “life gives life,” deferring to evolution 
to account for diversity among living things?  The Thomistic con-
ception of the soul is shown to be antiquated, offering only a the-
ologically-defined philosophy that adds little, if anything, be-
yond speculation to scientific inquiry into man’s cognition.  This 
results in Thomas’ explication of the soul as relevant only in 
terms of classical literature of Medieval thought.  
But if latitude is to be given to those whose ideas penetrate 
levels of academia, social stratification, religious divides, and 
culture and tradition, then the following philosophical postula-
tion serves as an analogous counter-point to the Thomistic con-
ception of the soul.  Following the cynical assertion of John Len-
non’s that “God is a concept / by which we measure / our 
pain,”18 conceptually speaking, the notion “God” represents 
“good” when good is perceived to be in abundance.  Conversely, 
the notion of a God assumes the role of straw man when evil is 
perceived to be in abundance; all the while the notion of a God 
never ceases to exist, and our experiences and perceptions of 
truth and happiness are defined by our interpretations of His na-
ture—His nature, to be sure, as man defines it and instills in Him 
(i.e., God is created in the image of man).  In like manner, then, 
the notion of the soul never ceases to exist. I should posit that the 
soul is an abstract concept—a conception—by which belief there-
in skirts seemingly unanswerable questions, while it simultane-
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ously represents the answers to said questions, which thus de-
fines and affirms belief in the soul with circular reasoning.  This 
is an issue for the empirically minded materialist because “the 
status of the circular argument is only that of persuasion.  It can-
not be made logically or even probabilistically compelling for 
those who refuse to step into the circle,” according to physicist 
and philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn.19  Consequently, these 
“seemingly unanswerable questions” that result from the belief 
in the conception of the soul include: What is the meaning of life; 
Why is man deemed a rational animal and is he truly rational; To 
what ends does reason lead the inquisitive man to infer there to 
be an ordered purpose?—ad infinitum.  But it has been consistent-
ly shown throughout history that man can neither answer these 
questions definitively nor unanimously (e.g., religion v. secular-
ism, science v. tradition), and man has therefore continued to 
look to an ethereal spirituality that, through its philosophical 
prevalence and understandings, has assumed a defensible role of 
representing reality—the soul represents man; man is real; there-
fore the soul is real.  Subsequently, the soul serves as via media 
between questions concerning man’s place and purpose within 
the cosmological design, and the infinitude in which man has 
ascribed undeniable meaning and essence (i.e., a Providential 
God of Creation and/or a purpose-driven cosmos).  And accord-
ing to the Thomistic view of the soul, the soul acts as the spiritual 
conduit that not only allows these questions to be posed 
(intelligence), but also allocates a sense of connectedness to said 
purpose (spirituality). When man’s intelligence and spirituality 
are used in conjunction with one another the result is the realiza-
tion of the defining human faculty of “rationality.”  Thus, Thom-
as proclaims man to be a rational animal whose employment of 
reason and spirituality are innate and necessary in man’s ulti-
mate goal of happiness.  
The question then becomes: Is happiness intrinsic?  It seems 
plausible to say that humans define happiness in terms of con-
text, time, and space; this would also cohere with the evolution-
ary account of man.  Though this characterization does not seem 
to cohere with the notion of “happiness” as intrinsic, happiness 
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possesses an intrinsic value. In this way, happiness is a virtue.  
But in terms of specificity, contemporary definitions of personal 
happiness, assessed in context, results in extrinsic values as de-
termining happiness—thereby defining the virtue of happiness.  
In line with this rationale, Pinker says that “happiness tracks the 
effects of resources on [man’s] biological fitness” and that “there 
are more things that make us unhappy than things that make us 
happy.”20  Granting this, the soul conception serves the false pre-
tence of guaranteeing, or at least defining, man’s due happiness.  
But through our evolved nature we must work towards happi-
ness as we see fit and also as it is defined in the contemporary 
and temporal reality.  This fact is not absent from the work of 
Thomas, but the question now becomes: How does the Thomistic 
soul account for man’s pursuit of happiness in light of evolution?  
This question complicates the mind-body problem to the point 
that I assert that the Thomistic soul cannot reconcile the apparent 
discord between a hylomorphic dualistic reality and man’s unde-
niable evolution in an evolved world.   
Accordingly, happiness is man’s goal, though not for the im-
petus or ends of a soul.  This is made clear by philosopher of sci-
ence Karl Popper and neurophysiologist John Eccles in their as-
sessment of the mind-body problem.  They reason that to attrib-
ute answers of life and consciousness and the pursuit of happi-
ness to an immaterial soul, “gives rise to a whole new set of 
problems.”  They go on to ask that if man is defined by his soul, 
“[h]ow does my soul come to be in liaison with my brain [which] 
has an evolutionary origin?”21 How, then, can an immaterial in-
formant, which is subsistent and incorruptible, cohabitate with 
the material and mediate any life functions of the physically and 
mentally evolved human being?  How can an un-evolved thing 
define oscillating definitions of happiness in an evolved world?  
The following argument shows the notion of the Thomistic soul 
to be asymmetrical to man’s evolved form:  
(i) Man realizes his human form by way of being in-
formed by his subsistent, incorruptible soul. 
(ii) The observable human form shows man to possess the 
faculty of reason, or rather, what it means for man to be human. 
15 
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(iii) If man has evolved, it should be reasonable to deduce 
that man has evolved from his being informed by an already 
evolved soul. 
(iv) But the soul is subsistent and incorruptible, thereby 
inhibiting its own evolution and its ability to inform man of his 
evolved human form. 
(v) Yet man has evolved, and reasoning follows that the 
subsistent, incorruptible soul, which represents the explanation 
of man’s form, cannot inform man of what it means to be human. 
(vi) Consequently, reason deems the soul unfit to serve 
the explanatory purpose of what it means for man to be human. 
Thus, this argument renders the Thomistic soul, in its state of 
subsistence and incorruptibility, to be a false form of man, which, 
by definition, is unable to evolve.  As such, the Thomistic soul is 
an unnecessary conception for man’s definition of himself.  This 
assertion is arrived at because, as stated, man has evolved.  How, 
then, is the conception of the soul to reconcile this paradoxical 
disparity?  Perhaps my argument has not allowed the soul its 
due autonomy, wrongly discrediting its essential, undeniable, 
otherworldly, and atemporal characteristics.  What is clear, how-
ever, is that the question of soul existence and its conceptual rele-
vance begs for a dualist counterargument.  However, as long as 
the soul is defined in Thomistic terms—form and matter, subsist-
ent and incorruptible, thereby equating to one—reconciliation 
seems to be an insurmountable task; if pursued, it would result 
in a soul of modern apologetics defined as a first principle and 
affirmed by faith.  
It should be stated that the efforts exerted here are not to 
“disprove” soul existence, for this is as impossible as “proving” 
soul existence.  Rather, what is of primary concern is that the no-
tion of holding to traditions of the soul22 in place of what we can 
see, what we can prove, what we can know, can be regarded as 
inhibiting free thought concerned with answers beyond the nou-
menal soul.  This is the case because the sciences of the rational 
man instill hopes of further explaining and understanding our-
selves and our place in the universe, which complements philo-
sophical inquiry.  But regardless of soul conceptions and beliefs 
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therein, Saint Thomas of Aquino’s man-defining teleological pur-
pose of life’s pursuit of happiness seems worthwhile.  And yet, 
conceptually speaking, notions of a soul are not necessary for the 
defining and attainment of said happiness, and thus do not de-
termine man’s spirituality.   
Our assessments of physical “proofs” tell us more about our 
makeup, cognitive faculties, and experiences than does debating 
the metaphysics of the immaterial thing that is presumed to de-
fine a hylomorphic dualistic reality.  The result of approaching that 
slippery slope is that the Thomistic soul is offered as authorita-
tive: Thomas’ presuppositions of the soul results in the defining 
of an assumed truth rather than verifying said truth to actually 
be.  The epistemological problem that results from this fallacy, as 
arrived at by Rubenstein, is that the soul “stands squarely on the 
boundary line between science … and religion.”23  In turn, the 
soul defines that boundary line in terms of mitigation. That is, if 
science were to ever account for everything knowable about man 
and human experience, then the reasoning employed would 
have necessarily derived from the life-defining virtues of the 
soul.  But how is it that we can affirm immateriality as defining 
materiality?  Finally, the intellectual nature of the soul outlined 
by Thomas Aquinas allows man his requisite reasoning abilities 
to contest, and even deny, the soul’s very existence.  If the ex-
planatory nature of this premise is accepted, then the very thing 
that gives man his form is thereby proven by its own virtue to no 
longer serve as relevant for man’s understanding of himself.  The 
reasoning for identifying with materialism, versus belief in dual-
ism, shows the soul to be an archaic conception, unfit to explain 
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